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Adoption Rationale and Post-Adoption Activity: 




 The purpose of this study was to explore the extent to which rationalistic and institutional 
considerations affect the decision to adopt information technologies and to explore how adoption 
rationales relate to the extent of implementation achieved after adoption. A multiple-case study 
approach was used.  Institutional isomorphism rationales were more prevalent than strategic 
choice rationales.  The most extensive implementations were found in organizations with a 
strategically-oriented rationale for adopting and/or extending use of EDI.  The study also found 
evidence of a shift toward strategic choice rationales for EDI extension.  These shifts in rationale 
originated to some extent in the same institutionally-based mechanisms that motivated the initial 





Adoption Rationale and Post-Adoption Activity: 
Institutional and Strategic Influences on EDI Adoption and Implementation 
 
 Organizations adopt information technologies for a variety of reasons.  Although it seems 
reasonable that the decision would be part of a well-conceived plan to improve organizational 
performance, we find that there are often other, less rationalistic reasons for adoption.  As 
Markus has noted, information systems' purposes may be "to appear as though they were 
intended to rationalize work or to improve decision-making without having any real impact on 
organizational procedures or outcomes” (1983:6). Although the question of what motivates 
information technology adoption might be interesting in its own right, one might also ask what 
difference it really makes.  Does anything different happen after adoption when the motivation or 
rationale for adoption is different?  We might, for example, consider whether, in a situation 
involving non-rationalistic reasons for adoption, a very superficial implementation might be all 
that is necessary to achieve the adopters’ goals. Similarly, if a technology were adopted in an 
effort to make the organization more efficient or to gain a competitive advantage, might we find 
a much more concerted effort to implement and make use of the technology? 
 These differing perspectives on why organizations adopt information technologies fall 
into two broad categories -- a rationalistic perspective oriented toward improving organizational 
performance and an institutional perspective which expects technology decisions to be governed 
by exercises of power and efforts to maintain organizational legitimacy (Kling, 1980; Markus 
1983).  An understanding of  the prevalence of each of these rationales for IT adoption might 
prove helpful in understanding the disappointing track record associated with many IT 
implementations and unexpected patterns of IT diffusion.  As Weill (1992) has suggested, 
understanding how IT affects firm performance may depend on categorizing IT investments by 
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the management purposes for which the investments are made. The purpose of this study is to 
explore the extent to which rationalistic and institutional considerations affect the decision to 
adopt information technologies and to explore how adoption rationales relate to the extent of 
implementation achieved after adoption. 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES RELATED TO INNOVATION ADOPTION 
 The organizational theories which formed the foundation of this study -- strategic choice 
and institutional isomorphism -- were selected because they represent the two primary schools of 
thought in organizational decision-making research (Goodstein, 1994) and they are specifically 
applicable to innovation adoption and utilization decisions (e.g., Teo, Wei et al., 2003; Tingling 
& Parent, 2002; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001; Barrett & Walsham, 1999; King et al. 1994; Kling 
& lacono, 1988; Child , 1987).  Strategic choice, typical of rationalistic perspectives on 
organizational action, suggests that technology adoption decisions are made voluntarily in order 
to optimize the achievement of objective organizational goals (Chandler, 1962; Child, 1972, 
1987; Whittington, 1988; Hitt & Tyler, 1991).  According to this school of thought, choice of 
strategy is guided by a concern for efficient use of resources in accomplishing organizational 
goals.  The role of information technology in the strategic choice model is specifically described 
in Child (1987).  In a series of considerations of how IT may be used to accomplish 
organizational objectives, Child laments the failure to use IT to its fullest potential, a possibility 
achievable only if the technology is made a part of the organizational routine and subsequently 
infused into its processes (Cooper & Zmud,  1989, 1990). 
 In contrast to strategic choice’s expectation of organizational variation, institutional 
isomorphism theory  begins by asking why organizations have become so homogeneous 
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(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991).  DiMaggio and Powell, arguing that “structural change in 
organizations seems less and less driven by competition or by the need for efficiency”  
(1983:147), see a tendency toward unreflective organizational action.  Seemingly irrational and 
ineffective practices are expected to persist due to a “taken-for-granted” correctness conferred by 
a process of legitimation and reproduction through self-sustaining structures established in 
organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  An organization's field is represented by its 
industry group and its trading partners, as well as professional groups from such areas as 
management, accounting, and information systems that act as important reference groups as the 
organization's professional members make decisions about what is the best course for the 
organization.  In such an institutional environment, rewards may be given more for conformity to 
institutional rules, myths, and symbols than for efficiency and effectiveness in production 
(Fennell & Alexander, 1987).  These rules and myths may lead the organization to adopt 
technologies more for their symbolic value than for their technical efficiency, signaling other 
organizations of its commitment to rationality and good business practice (Perrow, 1979; Pfeffer, 
1981; Fennell & Alexander, 1987). 
 Three different sources of this tendency toward homogeneity (i.e., isomorphism) are 
proposed  in institutional isomorphism -- coercive, normative, and mimetic (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell note that these mechanisms are not always empirically 
distinct.   They point out that all three mechanisms might be involved in a single action as, for 
example, an organization might be coerced by members of a professional organization into 
imitating its peers. The typology is delineated into three mechanisms to facilitate analysis.  
Coercive isomorphism refers to organizational conformity with formal and informal 
pressures brought to bear by organizations on which the organization depends and by cultural 
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expectations arising from the society in which the organization operates.  Normative 
isomorphism refers to the homogenizing effects of professionalization within the 
organization.(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991).  Professional associations encourage 
organizations to conform to standards of professional practice disseminated through formal 
education and participation in professional networks and associations that promote the 
legitimation of the profession’s autonomy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), through such means as 
workshops, seminars, training sessions, and professional publications (Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989).  Mimetic isomorphism is associated with conditions of uncertainty.  When 
an organization is faced with uncertainty about organizational technologies or ambiguity about 
goals, it may resolve the problem by imitating the practices of other organizations that it 
considers successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dacin, 1997; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Greve 
and Taylor, 2000; Staw & Epstein, 2000).  Awareness of other organizations' practices is 
fostered by environmental actors like consultants, industry trade associations, regulatory bodies, 
and public opinion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996). 
 Strategic rationales and institutional rationales for organizational action are not mutually 
exclusive.  Just as the decision to take a particular action may at the same time involve elements 
of mimetic, coercive, and normative influence, it may also involve desires to achieve 
organizational efficiencies or to gain a competitive advantage.  The complementary nature of 
strategic and institutional rationales is suggested by DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) recognition 
of two types of isomorphism in organizational fields: competitive and institutional (Mizruchi & 
Fein, 1999).  DiMaggio and Powell note that “organizations compete not just for resources and 
customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic 
fitness” (1983:150).  This is consistent with Scott’s (1987) contention that institutional 
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arguments are better seen as complementing and contextualizing rational and efficiency 
arguments than as opposing them (Dacin, 1997). 
The Study 
 The study used to address the research questions is described in the following section. 
The data were gathered as part of a more extensive exploration of EDI adoption rationale using 
interview data gathered in 1992 and 1993. The first portion of this section deals with the design 
of the study. The last two portions describe the data gathered with respect to the rationales for 
adoption of EDI and the extent of implementation achieved in each of the organizations. 
 Design.  A multiple-case study of ten organizations that adopted EDI was undertaken.  
EDI was chosen as the focal technology because of the organizational performance 
improvements predicted for its use and the interorganizational relationship patterns which are 
inherent in its implementation.  Organizations were selected in accordance with EDI connection 
patterns:  two organizations that were among the first to adopt EDI and whose positive 
experiences with EDI were reported in their industry group, four less publicized adopters in the 
same industry sector, and four smaller trading partners that had implemented an EDI exchange 
with the first two organizations. 
 Respondents in each of the organizations were executives and managers who had been 
involved in the EDI adoption and extension decisions (see Table 1).  At Focal-A, Competitor-A, 
Competitor-B, Supplier-B, and Supplier-D, it was possible to talk with the decision-makers 
themselves.  At Focal-B, the manager of control and audit was also the champion who 
shepherded the process of EDI adoption, and at Competitor-C and Competitor-D, it was possible 
to talk with the chief implementers of the initial EDI applications.  The accounts of EDI adoption 
given by the respondents at Supplier-A and Supplier-C were confirmed in interviews with the 
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trading partners with whom they implemented the companies’ first EDI applications. 
Interviews of 1 – 1 ½  hours were conducted with two respondents in each large 
organization and with one respondent for each small organization.  The interviews were tape-
recorded and transcribed for later analysis.  Since the small organizations were suppliers for the 
larger organizations included in the study, the responses of both the large and the small 
organizations were correlated to gain an informal triangulation of their accounts (Lacity & 
Janson, 1994).  Similarly, since the larger organizations were all competitors in the petroleum 
industry, their references to the actions of competitors provided further substantiation of the 
accounts given in the interviews.   
  Analysis of responses was pursued with a recognition that institutional and strategic 
choice rationales for adoption are not mutually exclusive.  Dean and Sharfman (1996), for 
example, note that procedural rationality and political reasons for decisions are distinct 
dimensions of the strategic decision-making process, thus indicating that a decision may be 
rational but not political, political but not rational, both or neither.   
 Historical and contextual records were also consulted to gain additional insight into the 
reasons for adoption, as well as to serve as a check on the validity of the exegetical analysis 
(Lacity & Janson, 1994).  These included internal project justification reports, magazine articles 
describing the organizations' adoption of EDI, internal EDI progress reports, internal memos 
related to EDI trading partner recruitment, published accounts of EDI adoption history within the 
petroleum and chemicals industries, journal articles related to EDI within the petroleum industry, 
Transportation Data Coordinating Committee (TDCC) conference proceedings, and the 
organizations' annual reports. 
 In the case examples which follow, the participating companies are named according to 
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their positions in the study, with Focal-A and Focal-B representing the two publicized adopters, 
Competitor-A, Competitor-B, Competitor-C, and Competitor-D representing their competitors, 
and Supplier-A, Supplier-B, Supplier-C, and Supplier-D referring to the small suppliers. Annual 
company revenues ranged from as much as $40 billion to as little as $35 million.  The 
companies’ staff sizes ranged from as many as 40,000 to as few as 80 employees.  The largest of 
the companies were Focal-A, Focal-B, Competitor-A, and Competitor-B.  The smallest were the 
suppliers.  Time since adoption ranged from 3 to 9 years.  The latest adopters, having adopted 
within 3 to 5 years of the study, were Competitor-C, Supplier-B, Supplier-C, and Supplier-D.    
 
Adoption Rationales 
  As suggested by the goals of the study, the reasons for deciding to implement the initial 
EDI application were explored in the interviews.  In the course of discussing subsequent EDI 
extension activity (e.g., extending EDI to other customers), it became apparent that decisions to 
extend the EDI implementation were very similar to the original decision to adopt, although 
often accompanied by different rationales than those that governed the adoption decision.  
Consequently, in the analysis of the results, the reasons for implementation were explored with 
respect both to initial decisions to adopt and subsequent decisions to extend the EDI 
implementation.    
What follows are brief summaries of the adoption and extension rationales provided by 
each company’s respondents, as well as excerpts from the interviews.  The names of the 
respondents have been changed to protect their privacy.  Reasons for adoption and extension 






Information about Focal-A’s experience with EDI was obtained from Mr. Smith, a senior 
purchasing accountant and manager, and Mr. Jones, manager of EDI for the whole corporation, 
both of whom were involved in the first EDI implementations at Focal-A.   Focal-A’s decision to 
adopt EDI was a gradual process exhibiting evidence of both strategic choice and institutional 
rationales.  
Mimetic influences can be seen in the accounts of early awareness of EDI and the 
decision to adopt. Mr. Smith indicated that Focal-A staff members had attended TDCC trade 
shows and had been aware of the EDI initiatives underway in the automotive industry.  Mr. 
Smith described how the manager of an accounting-related computing group had come back 
from a TDCC meeting convinced that EDI should be pursued within Focal-A.   The manager 
wrote a position paper on the desirability of implementing EDI and formed an internal 
coordinating group to begin introducing EDI into Focal-A's activities.  At about the same time, 
one of Focal-A's general managers attended an executive business roundtable meeting and heard 
of the commitment to EDI by large companies like General Motors and Ford.  According to Mr. 
Smith, the general manager "came back with a target -- kind of like putting a man on the moon.  
He wanted to see Focal-A using EDI."  The decision to adopt came when a group of Focal-A’s 
managers agreed to participate in an EDI pilot project involving Dupont, Chemical Leaman, and 
Conrail.  Focal-A’s managers heard what the other companies were doing and decided that EDI 
“made sense”.   
Normative influence in the form of a desire for professional legitimation also played a 
role in the decision.  Mr. Jones, whose group implemented the pilot application, cited a need to 
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improve morale in the accounting group as a reason for agreeing to implement and help recruit 
carriers to join in the project.  Implementing an EDI application would “help make the work 
more interesting, more challenging and less rote.” Morale was low not only because the work 
was routine, but because the group was considered "the graveyard of accounting."  As a result of 
implementing the EDI application, the group came to be seen as "the forerunner of accounting." 
 A strategic choice rationale was also evident.  To gain management approval for the pilot 
project, EDI was presented as a means of reducing the cost of processing transactions by 
reducing the number of personnel assigned to the associated accounting group.  Mr. Jones 
reported that his group undertook a cost/benefit analysis beforehand and followed up by  
monitoring the results after implementation.  The project produced measurable cost reductions.  
About half of the staff were moved to other areas of the organization as a result of the reduction 
in transaction handling requirements. 
Extension 
  As Focal-A continued to expand its commitment to EDI, its reasons for extending to 
additional applications of EDI continued to include a focus on efficiency improvement.  The 
selection of subsequent EDI transactions was accompanied by conscious concern for cost 
reduction.   
Focal-B 
Adoption 
Information about Focal-B’s experience with EDI was obtained from Mr.Green, an 
accountant serving in the controller’s office at the time of Focal-B’s adoption of EDI.  Mr. Green 
was also a leader in COPAS, a society of crude oil petroleum accountants. Information was also 
obtained from Ms. Brown, a joint interest accountant who was very active in professional 
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organizations of petroleum accountants.  Both Mr. Green and Ms. Brown  were EDI advocates at 
Focal-B.   The adoption decision at Focal-B was a gradual process, exhibiting both strategic 
choice and institutional influences on the decision.  
Normative and mimetic influences can be seen in the awareness of EDI that led up to its 
adoption.  Awareness of EDI came from the involvement of Focal-B’s accountants with other 
accounting professionals from the oil and gas industry.  Mr. Green became aware of EDI when 
COPAS began to take an active role in standardizing emerging intra-industry data exchanges.  
Similarly, Ms. Brown reported that the petroleum industry professional group she was involved 
in  had concluded that EDI would be a standard feature of future business practice: 
So the industry took up the cause as well, saying, "Well, if [General Electric] can do it or 
if General Motors is going to be doing it, that's going to be the future.  So we better start 
promoting it."   
 
Consultants were the messengers who published the positive accounts essential to Focal-B's 
imitation of others' EDI actions.  Representatives of General Electric and a professor, Dr. Ned 
Hill, who were serving as EDI consultants to the accounting organizations, described General 
Motors' determination to establish a paperless operation.  
 Evidence of strategic choice rationales for adoption are also found in the respondents’ 
accounts.  Asked if he felt any pressure for Focal-B to get into EDI, Mr. Green answered: 
Well, sure. All the presentations you heard – that number one, if you don’t do it, others 
will and they’ll  be the lower-cost producer, and number two, if you don’t get involved in 
it early and get your system set up, other people will tell you how to set your system up 
and it will cost you more than it would if you started early.  
 
Mr. Green worried about the possibility of being at a competitive disadvantage by not being 
among the early adopters.  In his presentations to management, Mr. Green emphasized “cost 
savings and value added”.  The predicted advantages for Focal-B were based on the reported 
advantages gained by the automotive and manufacturing industries.  Mr. Green described the 
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presentation: 
First of all, definitions and economics – potential economics – and then how I see it 
working with Focal-B.  I predicted out two to five years what the transactions would be, 
what the savings would be, what the organization impacts would be, as best as I could at 
the time…And I drew [a graph] that looked like [Dr. Hill’s] and I quoted him and said 
it’s going to take a couple of years to set this up, but once you see what happens and, if 
and when the business picks up, we’ll be able to respond to it quicker and with less 
people even than now. 
 
Extension 
Management approved the implementation of two pilot applications, but their support for 
EDI was lukewarm.  Although Mr. Green was able to get the controller and the vice-president of 
MIS to sign a letter saying that EDI was the preferred way of doing business, it didn’t seem to 
make much difference.  Mr. Green noted, “I don’t think anybody ever read that letter and I never 
pulled it out like a gun or anything.”  Mr. Green continued to have difficulty in getting the staff 
he needed to implement the EDI pilot projects and MIS support for the technical aspects of the 
implementation.  Once the individuals who had championed EDI left the company, management 
discontinued all but one of the EDI projects.  No further extension of EDI had been undertaken 
at the time of the study. 
Competitor-A 
Adoption 
Information about Competitor-A’s experience with EDI was obtained from Ms. Butler, 
the MIS staff member tasked with responding to the first EDI demand, and Mr. Lowe, vice-
president of MIS at the time of adoption.   Ms. Butler was serving as Competitor-A’s EDI 
coordinator at the time of the interview. 
Coercive influence is evident in Competitor-A's decision to adopt EDI.  The decision was 
made in response to General Motors' demand that its suppliers adopt the new technology.  
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Competitor-A's management perceived that the company was sufficiently dependent on General 
Motors to warrant immediate acquiescence.  Ms. Butler described the initial contact: 
My first introduction to EDI was when…an industrial customer of lubricants called and 
said, “You will do EDI with us”, and we said, “Sure we will.  What is it?”   And it was 
General Motors. 
  
Normative influence on adoption also played a role in the decision.  Mr. Lowe observed, 
"There was never any question in my mind or anybody else in the company's that that's what we 
wanted to do."  His professional affiliation predisposed him to favor the implementation of 
electronic document exchange:   
This was obvious to many of us as we moved into the computing field -- that this whole 
way of doing business, you know, this whole concept ... I guess the paperless office was 
always something you heard about, dreamed about -- never thought it would come into 
fruition, but you wanted to try to make as much of that come true as possible ... It was 
just so right. 
 
 Mimetic influence was evident in the pressure the chemical division personnel began to 
feel as they learned that many of the chemical companies had already endorsed EDI and were 
actively pursuing its standardization and implementation: 
A number of the chemical companies had endorsed EDI and were pushing ahead with it 
and [Competitor-A's chemical division] was beginning to feel the pressure of that 
because it had become a hot topic among the executives of those chemical companies 
... At their gatherings, chemical industry gatherings ...  as soon as the [Competitor-A] 
executive was beginning to get a left-out feeling in some of these conversations, that 
put more thrust into it. 
 
Extension 
.   Strategic rationales are found in Competitor-A’s decision to extend the use of EDI.  It 
was a senior executive's active support for EDI that prompted discussions of using EDI to  
improve operating efficiencies, focusing on the strategic role EDI could play within the 
company. The message conveyed a need to pursue EDI in order to achieve operating 
efficiencies: 
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[The message was] along the line of the global economy, and, you know, just the 
general business trends and looking for efficiencies ... 
 
The response to the letter was to adopt EDI as one of the key strategic initiatives to be pursued 
by Comp-A as it entered the decade of the 1990s.  By the time of the interview, new EDI efforts 
were subject to formal cost/benefit analysis, usually citing such advantages as expected savings 
and reduced manpower. 
Imitation of other companies in the petroleum and chemicals industries continued to be 
an influence in the days that followed the first EDI implementation effort.  As Competitor-A 
personnel began to attend ANSI X12 meetings, they found that a competitor from the petroleum 
industry was already participating, providing further evidence that EDI was going to become a 
"competitive necessity".   
Coercion also continued.  When other customers began to demand EDI relationships, 
Competitor-A agreed without hesitation: 
Again, another retailer . . . sent us a letter of "You will do EDI with us."  And we said, 






Information about Competitor-B's decision to adopt EDI came from Ms. Ford, the EDI 
coordinator for the North American marketing division, and Mr. Potter, the corporate EDI 
coordinator.  Awareness of EDI and the decision to adopt came as the result of coercion on the 
part of a large, important customer in the railroad industry.  Ms. Ford described the event: 
One of our major companies came to us and the bottom line was, “If you want to remain 
a preferred supplier, you will do EDI with us.” 
 
The railroad customer was among Competitor-B’s top ten customers and a customer of 
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Competitor-B’s parent company.  The decision to comply was based on Competitor-B’s strategy, 
described by Ms. Ford: 
And one of the strategies for or the mission for marketing is to be a preferred supplier.  
Call it a strategy or a mission, whatever you want to call it, being a preferred supplier is a 
key ingredient of that …[Competitor-B] has a philosophy, a basic marketing philosophy. 




 Strategic choice rationales and coercion are both found in the accounts of extending the 
use of EDI.  When EDI extensions were later demanded by Competitor-B’s customers, EDI 
proponents began to “evangelize” other Competitor-B personnel by relating success stories from 
other industries.  Expansion of customer-oriented EDI was presented as a “strategic project” that 
would benefit the customer and provide Competitor-B with a competitive advantage.  Ms. Ford 
described the internal sales effort undertaken to get project funding for a fully-integrated EDI 
invoicing application:   
For this project we did not sell on benefits ... We told them it was all cost and no 
tangible benefits.  But then we went into pages of intangibles at the end, explaining 
how that was going to benefit the customer.  And that's how we sold it as a strategic 
project. 
 
Customer-oriented EDI was viewed as a competitive advantage that would very likely become a 
competitive necessity in a not-too-distant future: 
So right now we view it as a competitive advantage to do EDI.  We anticipate that at 







 Information about Competitor-C's decision to adopt EDI came from Ms. York, a senior 
analyst hired to work on the initial EDI project, and Ms. Hughes, the manager of the MIS EDI 
group.  Evidence of mimetic influence can be seen in the accounts of early awareness and 
adoption of EDI. According to Ms. York, the first encounters with EDI were at a TDCC meeting 
attended by an MIS analyst and a member of the marketing staff.  The two staff members also 
attended a trading partner seminar hosted by Montgomery Ward, a customer that wished to 
initiate an EDI trading relationship with Competitor-C.  The proposed relationship with 
Montgomery Ward was not, however, the proposal that prompted a decision.  The decision to 
adopt EDI was made by the vice-president of MIS.  The first discussions about Competitor-C's 
participation in the relationship were initiated by IBM, serving as the value-added network  
provider for Wal-Mart.   The MIS executive agreed without significant consultation with the 
marketing executives.  According to Ms. York, the EDI aspects of the ensuing purchasing 
enhancement project were not of interest to the marketing personnel, but were part of "the deal" 
made between MIS and marketing to accomplish the objectives of both parties -- purchasing 
system enhancements for marketing and EDI for the MIS department: 
The users were a lot more interested in the enhancements to [the order processing 
system] than they were – I mean, they wanted to be able to get orders in faster – they 
wanted these new features…They were a lot more interested in the enhancements to the 
system than they were in EDI. 
 
Extension 
 Once Competitor-C got past the initial EDI implementation, discussions about EDI 
technology turned to efficiency improvement.  Respondents from Competitor-C noted that the 
success of the initial project led the marketing personnel to actively campaign for implementing 
EDI with another of their large customers: 
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And then, like from the [marketing] area, just the success of it has made a big 
difference. Because they were really -- I mean, once we had brought up the first couple 
of them ... they were saying, "We need to bring up Customer Y.  We have to bring up 
Customer Y. Customer Y is killing us with paperwork."  I mean, and so, it was like, 
"OK, we can see that there's a benefit to doing this." 
 
The extent of the shift in attitude can be seen in the justification used for one of 
Competitor-C’s later EDI implementation projects.  The project's cost/benefit analysis projected 
the elimination of staff as a result of the EDI implementation.  Competitor-C's management saw 
reduced cost, improved productivity and reduction of headcount as prime reasons for developing 
a corporate EDI strategy. 
Evidence of mimetic influence is also seen in Ms. Hughes’ account of Competitor-C's 
extensions of EDI usage: 
And there's a senior-level manager that says, "Hey, I talked to other companies and 
they say this is the thing to do and this is what I want to do." 
 
Ms. York noted that awareness of other companies' use of EDI helped convince management that 
it was a good idea: 
So if some of the people at Competitor-C go to these different industry user groups, 
they're also hearing about this ...  I mean, like, having the fact that they're hearing it from 
other companies in their own specialty field, I think, also helps.  Because it makes it -- 
when they come back here they go, "OK, everybody else is doing this, too.  We need to 
start looking into it."  
 
 Normative influence is seen Ms. York’s account of influence from the MIS professional 
staff.  Initiated and funded by MIS, the accountants who were directly affected by the proposed 
EDI transaction were not involved in the decision to implement: 
That was a strictly MIS thing.  And apparently, I guess, [the MIS vice-president] did 
not even bother talking to the users.  [He] was paying for that one.  That one was never 
charged back to the users.  That was his. 
 
Not only were the accountants not consulted, they didn’t believe the exchange was beneficial: 
And so our senior-level management were saying "we don't want to do this because we 
18 
don't get any benefit and it's going to cost us." 
 




Information about Competitor-D’s decision to adopt EDI cam from Ms. Grayson, the 
senior MIS analyst responsible for supporting the company’s EDI applications, and Ms. Barrett, 
Competitor-D’s MIS manager.  Mimetic influence can be seen in Competitor-D’s decision to 
implement its only EDI application.  Competitor-D first became aware of EDI when other oil 
and gas producers approached the company to ask them to participate in a check stub data 
exchange (CDEX), part of a larger EDI application known as PETROEX.  Competitor-D agreed 
to participate “basically to cooperate with other producers” with which the company had joint 
venture applications. In evaluating the request prior to implementation, Competitor-D's 
management decided that "the economics were fairly inexpensive", so the cost of cooperation 




 Information about Supplier-A’s decision to adopt EDI came from Mr. Dulles, EDI 
specialist and coordinator for all of supplier-A’s businesses.  Supplier-A's  adoption of EDI 
resulted from the coercive influence of one of its most important customers.  Mr. Dulles 
described the decision as "customer driven", with the customer saying, "We're going to do EDI 
with you”.  The response from Supplier-A's management was to agree without hesitation.. 
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Extension 
Strategic rationales and mimetic influences can be seen in Supplier-A’s decisions to 
extend their use of EDI.  As Supplier-A became more involved in supporting its customers' EDI 
needs and participating in industry-based EDI associations, senior management began to believe 
that EDI would be beneficial to the company in improving operating efficiencies: 
We like to be real involved in things like [EDI standards development], because we 
want to have efficient systems, we want to make EDI work, but then we also want to 
have low prices so that we can remain competitive . . . 
 
This aspect of the new attitude resulted in Supplier-A's planning to extend its implementation to 
include its own suppliers in order to get the full benefit of EDI: 
We’re doing EDI, but it’s not on a large-enough scale to save us money . . . You have 
to get your customers and your suppliers involved to really get the full benefit . . . 
We’re hoping to do that next year -- start really focusing on our suppliers . . . 
 
 Coercion continued as Supplier-A extended its use of EDI.  Mimetic influence is also 
seen in Supplier-A’s new attitude toward EDI after its initial compliance with a customer's 
demand.  When extensions to the original EDI implementation were demanded by other 
customers, the decision to comply with the first EDI demand came to be viewed as a matter of 
good fortune in that it permitted Supplier-A to get in on the ground floor of EDI usage and 
become one of its customers' favored suppliers: 
And, in turn, we hope that that will help [us], you know, get a name as being a 
progressive company that, you know, understands EDI and the concepts that need to 
take place for it to be successful in the industry . . . [The] major benefit would probably 
be PR.  The companies know that we’re doing EDI and that we’re part of the team -- a 




Information about Supplier-B’s decision to adopt EDI came from Mr. Arnold, a senior 
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manager whose responsibilities include oversight of applications of computer technology.  
Mimetic influence is seen in Supplier-B’s decision to adopt EDI.  Supplier-B’s first awareness of 
EDI came when Focal-A contacted them and asked if they would like to establish an electronic 
trading relationship, describing EDI as "the thing to do".  Mr. Arnold was glad to accept the 
offer, even "not knowing what we were really going into".  He was inclined to agree because he 
liked “computer stuff like that”.  The implementation went smoothly and resulted in cost 
reductions for Supplier-B and the advantage of being perceived as cooperative. 
Extension 
Extension of Supplier-B’s EDI implementation came as the result of coercion by its 
customers.  After the initial adoption of EDI, the company found that many customers required 
EDI support as a prerequisite to contract bidding: 
You have to have EDI, otherwise they say don’t [bid on the contract] . . . And there is a 





Information about Supplier-C’s adoption of EDI was provided by Mr. King, EDI 
coordinator for the MIS department.  Supplier-C’s first awareness of EDI came as the result of 
coercion in the form of adoption mandates from three of its largest customers.  The message 
conveyed was that continued supply relationships depended on supporting business via EDI.  
Supplier-C’s managers believed that  “We didn’t have a choice”. 
Extension 
 Further extensions of EDI came as the result of continued demands from Supplier-C’s 




Information about Supplier-D’s EDI adoption came from Mr. Mason, the company’s 
Chief Financial Officer.  Supplier-D agreed to adopt EDI because its management perceived that 
refusal to comply with a large chemical industry customer’s request would eventually result in 
losing the account.  Mr. Mason was responsible for responding to Apex Chemical’s request.  He 
described the initial contact, in which Apex asked the company to implement receipt of EDI 
orders: 
Apex said, “You will” … That was about it… saying, “It won’t be too many years before 
we won’t be doing business with anybody but people that have these things’ and they 
gave us a general idea of how far they expected us to go into it. 
 
Supplier-D had not extended its use to other EDI transactions at the time of the interview. 
 
Summary.  As shown in Tables 2 and 3, evidence of strategic choice rationales (improved 
efficiency and competitive advantage) were found in the adoption accounts of two companies 
and in five of the companies’ extension decision accounts.  Evidence of institutional 
isomorphism rationales (coercive, normative, and mimetic) were found in the adoption accounts 
of all ten of the companies and in six of the companies’ extension decision accounts.  
 
 
Extent of Implementation 
 Achievement of productivity and performance improvements through the use of IT can 
be expected only if adoption is followed by usage extensive enough to achieve the efficiencies 
and advantages predicted at the outset.  Since implementations following adoptions consistent 
with institutional isomorphism were expected to be more superficial than those following 
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adoptions consistent with strategic choice, exploration of that possibility necessitated 
determining the extent of each company’s EDI implementation.   
 The possibilities for EDI use range from implementing only one transaction with a single 
trading partner to conducting all of a company's external business transactions via EDI.  Having 
noted a commonality in the ways in which the companies had implemented EDI, a 
comprehensive list of implementation actions was developed and used to categorize the extent of 
adoption for each company.  The implementation actions which emerged from the cases are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 The stage of implementation was assessed using the implementation stage model 
developed by Cooper and Zmud (1989, 1990).  The implementation actions which emerged from 
the cases were: 
(1) Integration of EDI transactions with the transaction processing systems which use 
or create them 
 (2) Extension of EDI with its first trading partners  
 (3) Active recruitment of trading partners for the first EDI application 
 (4) Participation in standards organizations and EDI advocacy groups 
 (5) Creation of an enterprise-wide EDI coordination position  
 (6) Implementation of new EDI transaction sets  
 (7) Active recruitment of new groups of trading partners  
 (8) Development of an EDI strategic plan 
 (9) Establishment of regular reports of EDI activity for senior management 
monitoring of goal accomplishment 
 
The implementation actions listed in Table 4 were mapped to the stage of implementation 
identified in Cooper and Zmud – acceptance, routinization or infusion.  The last three stages are 
ordered in terms of an increasingly extensive use of the technology, with stages consisting of: 
 Acceptance: 
  Process:  The information technology application is developed, installed, and 
maintained.  Organizational procedures are revised and developed.  
Organizational members are trained both in the new procedures and in the 
information technology application. 
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  Product:  The information technology application is  employed in organizational 
work. 
 Routinization: 
  Process:  Usage of the information technology application is encouraged as a 
normal activity. 
  Product:  The organization’s governance systems are adjusted to account for the 
information technology application; the information technology application is 
no longer perceived as something out of the ordinary. 
 Infusion: 
  Process:  Increased organizational effectiveness is obtained by using the 
information technology application in a more comprehensive and integrated 
manner to support higher level aspects of organizational work. 
  Product:  The information technology application is used within the organization 
to its fullest potential.  
 
 Table 4 summarizes the actions taken by each of the companies in implementing their 
initial and subsequent EDI applications. Table 4 also includes the stage of implementation 
achieved by each company, determined by considering the extent of implementation implied by 
the actions taken after adoption. The first five of the implementation actions are most consistent 
with the stage described as routinization.  Companies that had taken fewer than half of these first 
actions were classified as having reached only the acceptance stage of implementation; the 
remainder were considered to have reached the routinization stage.  The last four implementation 
actions are more consistent with efforts to infuse the technology throughout the organization.  
Companies that had taken at least half of these latter actions were considered to have begun the 
process of infusion. Table 5  shows the relationship between rationale (for adoption, extension 
and both) and the stage of implementation achieved by the company.   
 Having implemented the initial EDI application, most of the organizations included in the 
study decided to extend their use of the technology.  In some instances, organizations had 
positive experiences with their initial implementations of EDI.  Realization of reduced 
transaction handling or personnel requirements, for example, gave impetus to extending the use 
of EDI.  In other instances, organizations that had exhibited only institutional reasons for 
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adoption later expressed strategic choice rationales for extending their use of EDI.   This shift in 
rationale for implementation was not based upon actual benefits achieved within the 
organization, but seemed rather to flow from an awareness of the positive opinion of EDI 
entertained by competitors, business leaders, trade associations, and the proponents' respective 
professions.  Formal analysis of how the technology might specifically affect the organization 
was not performed.  The strategic benefits of EDI appear to have been accepted without 
question, thus suggesting that the strategic choice rationales within these organizations arose as a 
result of institutional influences.  Development of a strategic choice rationale for EDI usage 
seems to have resulted to some extent from the same sorts of institutional influences that led to 
adoption. 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the extent to which rationalistic (strategic 
choice) and institutional (institutional isomorphism) considerations affected the decision to adopt 
an information technology (EDI) and to explore how adoption rationale related to the extent of 
implementation achieved after adoption.  With respect to the first question, the picture that 
emerged was one of adoption in conformity with other organizations' actions, as well as for more 
rationalistic reasons.  Conscious, economically-oriented analysis of the potential effects of 
implementing EDI within the organization was not prevalent.  Decisions to make the initial 
investment were most often characterized by decisions influenced by coercion, normative 
influence or mimetic mechanisms. 
 Rationales consistent with institutional isomorphism were more prevalent than rationales 
consistent with strategic choice.  Although applicable to both initial adoption decisions and 
subsequent extension decisions, the prevalence of institutional rationales was most pronounced 
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with respect to the initial decision to adopt.  The shift toward strategic choice rationales for EDI 
extension originated to some extent in the same institutionally-based mechanisms that motivated 
the initial decisions to adopt the EDI technology.  In more than half of the cases, the initial EDI 
decision was made in a context bearing evidences of normative and/or mimetic influences.  In 
each of these instances, the organizational actors involved in deciding whether to implement EDI 
were confronted with performance improvement claims emanating from professional bodies 
(e.g., COPAS), trade associations (e.g., API, TDCC), and consultants (e.g., General Electric 
Information Services).  The arguments used in their own presentations about EDI's potential 
often came from these sources (evident, for example, in the use of a consultant’s graphs in EDI 
promotion presentations made to Focal-B's management and use of success stories from other 
industries in efforts to "evangelize" Competitor-B's personnel). 
 The second question addressed in this study concerned whether there is a relationship 
between reasons for adoption and the extent of subsequent implementation activity.  The picture 
that emerged suggests that such a relationship may exist.  No consistent pattern was found when 
attention was focused on the relationship between implementation extent and adoption rationale. 
 When the focus of attention was expanded to include the way in which reasons for using the 
technology evolved as its use was extended, i.e., to the more general utilization rationale, a 
clearer pattern emerged.  Organizations with the most extensive implementations had developed 
a strategically-oriented rationale for implementing EDI.  The most superficial implementations 
were associated with organizations whose utilization reasons were solely institutional. 
  Future research directions should include exploring the applicability of the study's 
findings beyond the scope of the current research design, focusing particularly on whether such 
results apply to other industries and technologies.  Future research should also explore whether 
26 
utilization rationale related to other technologies undergoes an evolution similar to that found 
among the organizations included in this study, shifting from institutional to more strategically-
oriented rationales over time.  In addition, research focusing on the structuration of 
organizational fields (Orlikowski and Robey, 1991; Giddens, 1979) and the process of 
institutionalizing or legitimating IT practices and technologies (DiMaggio, 1988) may prove 
enlightening.  In particular, exploration of the messages conveyed in motivating diffusion and 
consideration of whether organizational actors merely reinforce existing structures or actively 
seek to transform those structures could contribute to an understanding of how patterns of 
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Routinization  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Integrate with system  x  x x x x x  x  
Extend transaction set x  x  x  x x x  
Recruit for first transaction x x x     x  x 
Standards participation x x x x x x x      
EDI coordinator x   x x x   x   x  
Infusion Yes  Yes  Yes      
New transaction sets x x x   x          
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RATIONALE VERSUS STAGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 




   
Strategic Choice 0 1 1 
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Strategic Choice 0 3 3 
Institutional Only 3 1 0 
 
 
